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Abstract
In this article, we propose to view the firm as a locus of socialization in which employees with
heterogeneous work attitudes can be motivated and coordinated through adherence to a social
ideal of eﬀort. We develop an agency model in which employees have both a personal and a social
ideal of eﬀort. The firm does not observe the personal ideals, but can make its workforce more
sensitive to the social ideal by fostering interaction in the workplace. We show that there are two
reasons why the firm invests in social bonding. First, it reinforces the eﬀectiveness of monetary
incentives. Second, strengthening the social ideal reduces the adverse selection problem and the
need to devise distorted payment schemes. We also show that the firm allocates more time to
social interaction when personal ideals of eﬀort are low or heterogeneous.
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“Our oﬃces and cafes are designed to encourage interactions between Googlers within
and across teams, and to spark conversation about work as well as play.”
(Google website, 2013)
“I call it the ‘pronoun test’, I ask frontline workers a few general questions about the
company. If the answers I get back describe the company in terms like ‘they’ and ‘them,’
then I know it’s one kind of company. If the answers are put in terms like ‘we’ or ‘us,’
then I know it’s a diﬀerent kind of company.”
(Former U.S. Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, on visiting a company for the
first time)
1 Introduction
United Parcel Service (hereafter UPS) is known as a company that constantly strives to improve
its eﬃciency: packages are sorted by computers to optimize the order of delivery; delivery routes
are designed to avoid left turns, so that no time is wasted waiting for a gap in oncoming traﬃc;
and drivers have to maintain a fast pace when walking. The company, which is continually looking
to save seconds in the delivery chain, has a somewhat unexpected practice: several minutes are set
aside for drivers and loaders to engage in a “pre-work huddle”, a team gathering before the drivers
leave the distribution center. According to UPS management, the objective of this practice is to
engender a team spirit between loaders and drivers (Cohen and Prusak, 2001). Fostering a certain
amount of social bonding among employees is not unique to UPS. Over the past few decades, many
firms have introduced new practices to make it easier for employees to develop formal and informal
social interaction: new physical spaces such as open-plan oﬃces, places to relax, and meeting
points are designed to promote an environment of communication and information sharing among
colleagues; workshops and brainstorming sessions are held to stimulate collective creativity and
mutual understanding; information technologies, such as email, intranet and chats favor exchange;
and team building activities, defined as a variety of practices ranging from simple bonding exercises
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to complex simulations, aim to generate a sense of cohesiveness among employees.1,2
Why do some firms allocate time and space to foster social interaction between their employees?
Besides creating a great atmosphere and facilitating the emergence of new ideas, the literature on
organizational identification, a subfield of management literature, has suggested that, by promoting
interaction, a firm may be seeking to induce its workforce to identify as part of a collective (the
group or the organization) and behave in ways that are normative for the collective identity (e.g.,
Pratt, 2000; Ellemers, De Gilder and Haslam, 2004; Van Dick, 2004; Cohen and Prusak, 2001).
According to these authors, shifting the employees’ identity from being personal ("I") to collective
("we") has two positive consequences. First, group-based expectations, goals, or outcomes become a
source of implicit incentives for workers, that supplement or even replace more traditional monetary
incentives. Second, by promoting the collective identity, the firm can keep possibly heterogeneous
employees together and secure their involvement in the work environment. In this context, the
rise of practices aimed at encouraging employee interaction and building shared identities could be
interpreted as an attempt by firms to counter reduced loyalty (Casey, 1996) or increased diversity
(Cohen and Prusak, 2001) among their workforces. The firm is viewed as a “social community”
in which heterogeneous individuals can be motivated and coordinated at a smaller cost, through
identification with the collective (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Foss and Lindenberg, 2012).3
In this article, we develop an agency model to study how a firm may foster social interaction
among its employees to strengthen their shared identity and provide more eﬃcient incentives to exert
eﬀort. An employee’s identity is modeled as an ideal of eﬀort, which is a weighted combination of a
personal ideal and a social ideal. Personal ideals can diﬀer across employees and are not observed
by the firm. This gives rise to an adverse selection problem. Employees perform independent
1Cohen and Prusak (ibid.) give several examples of firms providing “space and time” to allow their employees to
interact. Notably, they describe how Alcoa, the world’s leading producer of aluminum, moved to new headquarters in
1998 in which glass-walled conference rooms, meeting places, kitchens, and escalators occupy the center of each floor
and are designed to encourage workers to meet, mix, and chat. According to the CEO, Paul O’Neill, the ultimate
goal was to promote “a sense of connection” among employees.
2Of course, firms may encourage a certain amount of social interaction on the workplace, but at the same time
block chatting with the outside world via social-networking websites. According the consulting firm Robert Half
Technology, 54 percent of U.S. companies were blocking social networks completely in 2009.
3The literature on organizational identification is based on insights from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner
1979). This theory suggests that a person’s identity is composed of two diﬀerent facets. Personal identity corresponds
to individual attributes that are not shared with other people. Social identity corresponds to attributes that result
from being a member of a social group. The literature on organizational identification goes a step further by suggesting
that an organization can reinforce its employees’ social identity through social bonding or training in order to create
implicit group incentives.
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production tasks, which means that the only externalities among workers are social. We obtain
four main results. First, we take the employees’ sensitivity to the social work ideal as given and
determine the optimal payment scheme. We show that, the more employees are sensitive to the social
ideal, the higher the power of monetary incentives chosen by the firm and its profits will be. This
result is a consequence of an eﬀect known in the economic literature as the social multiplier eﬀect,
which, when applied to an agency context, means that the existence of the social ideal reinforces
the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives (see for example Fischer and Huddart, 2008). Second, we
allow the firm to alter the employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal by choosing the portion of
working hours allocated to social interaction. Hence, the firm plays the role of norm regulator. For
the firm, there is a cost of investing in social interaction because less time is left for production.
There is also a benefit: by favoring social bonding the firm makes its workforce more sensitive to
the social ideal and engenders a “We” frame. The consequence is that the social multiplier eﬀect
is reinforced. We show that the firm allocates more time for social interaction when employees
have low personal ideals of eﬀort: motivating employees through the shared identity is used as a
substitute for low individual work ethics. Third, we show that investing in social interaction allows
the firm to alleviate the adverse selection problem. Contrary to the case of complete information
in which it is optimal for the firm to set the same intensity of monetary incentives for all types of
employees, the prevalence of asymmetric information leads the firm to propose a menu of contracts
in which there is a downward distortion of the incentives aimed at employees with low personal
work ideals. However, by promoting the shared social ideal, the firm is able to partially homogenize
the heterogeneous workforce and to reduce the contractual distortions resulting from incomplete
information. The consequence is that the firm gives employees more time to develop social ties
when the workforce is heterogeneous. Lastly, the model predicts that firms in which it is easier to
foster social interaction between employees, for example due to the nature of the business or the
design of the workplace, use less diﬀerentiated payment schemes than firms in which fostering social
interaction is harder. We will discuss some evidence provided by Frank (1984) suggesting that this
might indeed be the case. He compares the commission schedules used by automobile dealers and
real estate agencies and observes that the former use flat schedules while the latter generally use
ramped schedules. He argues that the diﬀerence comes from the fact that automobile salespersons
work together in the same location and interact a lot, while real estate agents spend most of the
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time with clients outside the oﬃce and interact much less.
There is a burgeoning theoretical literature that suggests that social norms have important eﬀects
on workers’ behavior in the workplace.4 Kandel and Lazear (1992) assume that members of a team
suﬀer a utility loss when their own eﬀort level falls short of that of their co-workers. The consequence
is that workers exert more eﬀort than if peer eﬀects were absent. In an agency context, Fischer
and Huddart (2008) show that the existence of social norms fosters the eﬀectiveness of monetary
incentives. Although they do not solve for the optimal contract, they derive some implications for
the organizational boundaries of firms by distinguishing between a desirable and an undesirable
action, each with its own norm. Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2012) show that a particular norm can
be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing, depending on the incentive scheme a firm oﬀers.
They further show that low-eﬀort equilibria (where someone exerts a low eﬀort because others do
the same) can coexist with high-eﬀort equilibria (where someone exerts a high eﬀort because others
do the same). Rob and Zemsky (2002) study the accumulation of social capital in a firm in which
a continuum of workers repeatedly perform an individual task and a cooperative task. The eﬀort
devoted to cooperation is not observable, but employees have preferences for helping that depend on
the degree of past cooperation. In this context, the firm can choose to limit the incentive intensity
on observable individual tasks in order to induce workers to be more helpful today and therefore
more pro-social tomorrow.5 Akerlof and Kranton (2008) consider an organization that is able to
aﬀect its workers’ identity (ideal of eﬀort) through its management style. There is a moral hazard
problem regarding workers’ eﬀort and the organization can either decide to monitor its workforce
closely or choose loose supervision. Monitoring workers allows easier detection of shirking, but
reduces workers’ ideal of eﬀort as there is less identification with the workgroup. Akerlof and
Kranton characterize the circumstances under which the organization prefers loose supervision.
Kübler (2001) uses a model of social custom à la Akerlof (1980) to understand how norms can
be influenced by “norm entrepreneurs” (e.g., government agencies, lawmakers, unions) through two
distinct exogenous instruments: monetary incentives and changes in the meaning of following a
norm. She shows that destroying an existing norm necessitates reaching a tipping point and thus
4We will discuss the growing empirical literature later in this article.
5Along these lines, Rotemberg (1994) and Dur and Sol (2010) consider models without social norms, but in which
two workers are endowed with altruistic preferences they can aﬀect by their choices. In Rotemberg, worker i decides
the degree to which he internalizes the utility of worker j. In Dur and Sol, worker i is able, by engaging in social
interaction with worker j, to increase j’s degree of altruism. Both articles show that it is rational for workers to
invest in altruistic activities to some extent.
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requires a large enough change in policies.
In the present article, we rely on the work of Fischer and Huddart (2008) to introduce a social
work ideal in the employees’ preferences. We add two novel elements to their article and the articles
mentioned above. First, we give an active role to the firm in managing the social ideal. More
precisely, the firm acts as a locus of socialization in which employees internalize the social work
ideal while they interact. It can regulate the process of internalization by allowing for more or less
social interaction through the relevant workplace and management practices. We show that a first
motive to invest in social interaction is to reinforce the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives. Second,
we allow for heterogeneity among employees with regard to their personal work ideals and we assume
that the firm does not observe these ideals. A second motive to invest in social interaction is to
create a shared identity in order to mitigate the adverse selection problem. The firm can make the
employees’ decisions incentive compatible at a smaller cost. More broadly, from a theory of the
firm perspective, our work provides a theoretical framework to explain how a firm, by acting as a
locus of socialization, can better handle the problems of motivating and coordinating workers with
heterogeneous work ethics.
The article is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical model. In section
3, we derive the optimal linear contract. In section 4, we analyze how the firm regulates the social
ideal among its employees. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modeling personal and social ideals
We consider a moral hazard framework à la Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and extend it in three
directions. First, we include a social work ideal in employees’ preferences, following Fischer and
Huddart (2008). Second, we allow for some heterogeneity in the workforce regarding personal
ideals of eﬀort. The characteristics of employees are unobserved by the firm, which gives rise to a
problem of adverse selection. Third, we consider the case where the firm can regulate the employees’
sensitivity to the social ideal.
Although the existence of social interaction between employees could also foster the exchange
of information, ideas and know-how, we omit introducing technological or informational spillovers
in the production process in order to focus on social spillovers and their management by the firm.
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Agents. A risk-neutral firm employs a continuum of size one of risk-adverse employees to perform
similar, but independent, tasks. Employees diﬀer in a single dimension denoted by t, which is
distributed over T =
⇥
t, t
⇤
by the distribution function F (t), with density f(t). We refer to t as
a personal ideal of eﬀort.6 Each employee exerts a level of eﬀort e, not observed by the firm, and
produces a publicly observable output y = e+ ⌫. The term ⌫ is an idiosyncratic unobservable noise
following a centered normal with variance  2. The noise terms are independent across employees.
As personal ideals and eﬀorts are not observed by the firm, the model features simultaneous adverse
selection and moral hazard problems.7
Contracts. As employees are heterogeneous with respect to their work ideal, the firm may find it
optimal to oﬀer diﬀerent contracts to diﬀerent types of employee. We denote the menu of contracts
by {w(t)}t2T where w(t) is the compensation paid by the firm to an employee with personal ideal
t. As is common in contracting literature, we limit attention to linear contracts of the shape
w(t) = ↵(t)y +  (t) where ↵(t) is the variable rate and  (t) is the base salary. We will sometimes
refer to ↵(.) as the power or the intensity of monetary incentives.
Payoﬀs. Employees have a constant absolute risk aversion. The utility function of an employee of
personal ideal t choosing the contract w and eﬀort e is given by
U(w, e, n(t)) = 1  exp [ ⌘ (w   C(e, n(t)))] (1)
where ⌘ represents the employee’s constant absolute risk aversion, and C(e, n(t)) = 12 (e  n(t))2
represents the extended cost function of the employee. The cost of eﬀort decreases up to the point
where the ideal n(t) is reached and increases beyond this point. The ideal reflects the work ethic
of the employee of type t and corresponds to the eﬀort that this employee exerts when the variable
rate of the compensation is zero but the base salary is suﬃciently high to satisfy the participation
constraint, which we define below. Following Fischer and Huddart (2008), the ideal n(t) is a weighted
average of two elements: the personal ideal of the employee, equal to t, and a shared social ideal
6We will also consider the “limit” case where employees are identical. In this case T =
 
tˆ
 
.
7See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) and Theilen (2003) for a general analysis of this type of models.
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taken equal to the average eﬀort across employees, E [e].8 We write
n(t) = (1   )t+  E [e] (2)
where   2 [0, 1). The term   of expression (2) reflects the employees’ sensitivity to the social
ideal. When   = 0, employees do not care about the social ideal of the workgroup and only take
into account their personal ideals when choosing their eﬀort levels. The standard quadratic cost
function is obtained by taking   = 0 and t = 0. Later, we will assume that the firm is able to alter
the sensitivity to the social ideal by allowing for more or less social interaction at the workplace. We
also assume that employees have the same reservation utility level U(w0) = 1   exp( ⌘w0) where
w0  t. We will verify that this last inequality guarantees that the firm is interested in hiring all
types of employees.
The risk-neutral firm’s expected profit is equal to the part of the expected production accruing
to the firm net of the fixed salaries paid to the employees:
t¯ˆ
t
[(1  ↵(t))e(t)   (t)] f(t)dt (3)
Timing of the game
1. The firm chooses the portion of working hours available for employees to interact. This choice
alters the employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal,  , in a way that we will describe in section
4.
2. The firm proposes a menu of contracts {w(t)}t2T .
3. Each employee chooses one contract or exercises his outside option.
4. Employees exert eﬀort. Outputs and payoﬀs are realized.
8Hence, the social ideal is associated with a unique reference group, which is the entire workforce. Each employee
is atomistic and therefore takes this social ideal as given.
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3 The optimal linear contract
In this section, we take the sensitivity of employees to the social ideal as given. First, we derive
the optimal level of eﬀort for employees. Second, we solve the problem of the firm and derive the
optimal menu of linear contracts.
3.1 Problem of an employee
Suppose for now that any employee selects the contract designed for him. An employee of personal
ideal t chooses his eﬀort level to maximize his certainty equivalent payoﬀ, ↵(t)e+ (t)  12 (e  n(t))2 
1
2⌘ 
2↵2(t). Solving for the optimal eﬀort gives
e(t) = ↵(t) + n(t) (4)
where n(t) is given by (2). Expression (4) characterizes the eﬀort exerted by the employee of type
t given the work ideal, n(t). If the firm does not provide any monetary incentive at all (that
is, if ↵(t) = 0), the employee chooses a level of eﬀort equal to his work ideal. By taking the
partial derivative of expression (4) with respect to ↵(t), one can study how increasing the monetary
incentive at the margin aﬀects eﬀort for a given ideal. We have
@e(t)
@↵(t)
= 1 (5)
Eﬀort increases as the firm provides more monetary incentives. We now endogenize the social ideal
by solving for the rational expectation equilibrium. At equilibrium, the eﬀort exerted by any type
of employee is a best reply to E [e]. By plugging expression (4) into E [e] =
´ t¯
t e(t)f(t)dt, we obtain
the equilibrium average eﬀort:9
E [e⇤] = E [t] +
E [↵]
1    (6)
where E [↵] =
´ t¯
t ↵(t)f(t)dt is the average power of monetary incentives and E [t] =
´ t¯
t tf(t)dt is
the average personal ideal. Expression (6) shows that there are three sources fueling employees’
average eﬀort: their average personal work ideals, their social orientation, and the average power of
9The fact that @e(t)/@E [e] =   < 1 implies that there is only one equilibrium in eﬀort levels (see Cooper and
John (1988)), as opposed to the framework of Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2012).
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monetary incentives. Interestingly, the relationship between average eﬀort and the average personal
work ethic is not aﬀected by the employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal: for the firm, having a
pro-social workforce does not reduce the positive influence of personal ideals on eﬀort. However, the
relationship between average eﬀort and the average power of monetary incentives is aﬀected by the
sensitivity to the social ideal: a higher sensitivity makes monetary incentives more eﬀective. The
two previous results are driven by similar social multiplier eﬀects. We first describe the multiplier
eﬀect on monetary incentives. Analytically, it takes the following shape, with a slight abuse of
notation:
dE [e⇤]
dE [↵]
=
1
1    =
1
1    ⇥
@E [e]
@E [↵]
(7)
with 1/(1    )   1. To explore the functioning of the multiplier, let us sum expression (4) over
types, weighted by the density f . We obtain
E [e] = E [↵] + (1   )E [t] +  E [e] (8)
Let us suppose that the average power of monetary incentives E [↵] increases by an amount equal to
4E [↵]. In a first round, this has a direct eﬀect on average eﬀort: the right-hand side in expression
(8) increases by4E [↵], which causes the left-hand side E [e] to increase by the same amount. In the
second round, the change in monetary incentives has an indirect eﬀect on eﬀort through the social
ideal: the higher social work ideal that emerged in the first round induces employees to exert even
more eﬀort. Formally, the right-hand side increases by  4E [↵]. This causes again an equivalent
rise in the left-hand side. Summing the successive increases, we obtain:
4E [e⇤] = ⇥1 +  +  2 + ...⇤4E [↵] = 1 +  
1   
 
4E [↵] = 1
1   4E [↵] (9)
The multiplier 1/(1    ) can therefore be understood as the sum of the direct monetary eﬀect, 1,
and the indirect social eﬀect,  /(1   ).
The same type of social multiplier eﬀect also explains why the relationship between the aver-
age eﬀort and the average work ideal is not aﬀected by employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal:
dE [e⇤] /dE [t] = 1. To understand why, let us suppose that the average personal ideal E [t] increases
by4E [t] in expression (8). At first, this has a direct eﬀect on eﬀort: 4E [e] = (1  )4E [t]. There-
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after, there is an infinite sequence of indirect eﬀects, through increases of the social ideal. Summing
the successive eﬀects, we obtain 4E [e⇤] = ⇥(1   ) + (1   ) + (1   ) 2 + ...⇤4E [t] = 4E [t].
Using equations (4) and (6), we can express the eﬀort of an employee of personal ideal t as
e⇤(t) = (1   )t+  E [t] + 1
1    ((1   )↵(t) +  E [↵]) (10)
Expression (10) states that the eﬀort level e⇤(t) is increasing in the power of incentives, ↵(t), and
in the average power of incentives, E [↵]. When employees become more sensitive to the collective
(that is, when   increases), an employee with below average personal ideal (that is, t < E [t])
increases his eﬀort level. Indeed, the employee becomes more influenced by the average work ethic
of the group, E [t], while at the same time the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives is reinforced.10
However, an employee with an above average personal ideal (that is, t > E [t]) may choose a higher
or a lower eﬀort level under the same circumstances: while the employee is attracted by the lower
average work ethic of the group, monetary incentives become more eﬀective so that the total eﬀect
is ambiguous. We summarize the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (1) Consider a given menu of linear contracts {w(t)}t2T .
(a) The relationship between the average level of eﬀort E [e⇤] and the average personal ideal E [t]
is not aﬀected by the employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal.
(b) The average level of eﬀort E [e⇤] is higher when employees are more sensitive to the social
ideal. In fact, employees with a below average personal ideal exert a higher level of eﬀort, whereas
employees with an above average personal ideal may exert a lower or a higher eﬀort.
(2) The fact that employees’ preferences incorporate a social ideal creates a social multiplier ef-
fect, defined in (7), which makes eﬀort more responsive to a change in monetary incentives. The
multiplier eﬀect is stronger when employees are more pro-social.
In their 2008 article, Fischer and Huddart introduce a social norm in an agency context and
derive the existence of a social multiplier eﬀect: social incentives reinforce the eﬀectiveness of
monetary incentives. Point 2 in Proposition 1 echoes their result. We, however, extend it to
the case of a heterogeneous workforce. Point 1(a) expresses a second social multiplier eﬀect that is
largely overlooked in the literature: having a more pro-social workforce does not weaken the positive
10Note that 11   ((1   )↵(t) +  E [↵]) = ↵(t) +  1  E [↵] is increasing in  .
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relationship between the average personal work ideal and the average eﬀort. Together with point
2, this implies 1(b): the average eﬀort is higher when employees are more sensitive to the social
ideal.11 Interestingly, while the eﬀort exerted by below average workers necessarily increases when
influenced by peers, the eﬀort exerted by above average workers may decrease or increase. These
theoretical results are in line with recent empirical findings. Mas and Moretti (2009) study how the
productivity of cashiers in a supermarket chain is aﬀected by the productivity of their peers. They
show that workers increase their eﬀort levels by 1% when a worker with above average productivity
joins their shift. They obtain two complementary results. First, while low-productivity workers
benefit from the presence of more productive workers, the productivity of high-skill workers is not
aﬀected by the presence of low-skill co-workers. Second, the magnitude of the spillover depends
positively on the frequency of interaction in the workplace. Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010)
study whether the productivity of fruit pickers is aﬀected by the presence of co-workers with whom
they share social ties. They consider a situation in which there are no externalities among workers
in production, or compensation. They find that, compared to a situation without social ties, a given
worker’s productivity is significantly higher when working with more able friends, but significantly
lower when working with less able friends.
To conclude this section, we calculate the certainty equivalent payoﬀ for an employee with
personal ideal t when he exerts the optimal eﬀort level (10). We have
u(t,↵(t), (t)) =  (t) +
 
1   ↵(t)E [↵] + ((1   )t+  E [t])↵(t) +
1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(t) (11)
Note that @2u/@t@↵(t) = 1    > 0: Employees with a high personal ideal are more sensitive to an
increase in the power of incentives than employees with a low personal ideal. This single-crossing
condition will help the firm to screen diﬀerent types of employees under incomplete information.
11In the model, the level of personal ideals is not aﬀected by the power of incentives proposed by the firm.
Accordingly, there is no crowding-out eﬀect of intrinsic motivation by monetary incentives. The model could be
extended to include a reduced form of the crowding-out mechanisms modeled in the literature (see, for example,
Francois (2000) in the context of public sector motivation, Canton (2005) in a multitask environment, Bénabou and
Tirole (2003) in an informed principal setting, and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) in the case of pro-social behaviors). We
omit, however, introducing such mechanisms and concentrate on the analysis of social norms and adverse selection.
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3.2 Problem of the firm
We now turn to the problem of the firm for a given level of employee sensitivity to the social ideal.
As a benchmark, we first consider the situation in which the firm knows the employees’ personal
ideals. We then consider the situation in which the firm cannot observe personal ideals.
3.2.1 The case of complete information about personal ideals
The firm determines the menu of contracts by maximizing its expected profit
max
{↵(t), (t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1  ↵(t))e⇤(t)   (t)) f(t)dt (12)
under the participation constraints
8t 2 T, u(t,↵(t), (t))   w0 (13)
where e⇤(t) is defined in (10) and u(t,↵(t), (t)) in (11). At the optimum, the participation con-
straints must be binding. We show in Appendix 1 that the firm’s program can be written
max
{↵(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
✓
↵(t)
1    + t  w0  
1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt (14)
Maximizing pointwise, we obtain the optimal power of incentives for each type of employee:
8t 2 T,↵⇤CI(t) =
1
(1   )(1 + ⌘ 2) (15)
where CI stands for complete information.12 Expression (15) extends the expression of the optimal
power of incentives derived in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to the case in which workers have
a social work ideal. As in their framework, the firm chooses low-powered incentives when the
perceived risk level, ⌘ 2, is high. Three other points are worth noting. First, the firm chooses the
same variable rate for all employees, regardless of their personal ideals. This is due to the fact
that the personal ideal of an employee does not aﬀect the way his eﬀort responds to monetary
12Note that the assumption t   w0 guarantees that ↵
⇤
CI (t)
1   +t w0  12 (1+⌘ 2)↵⇤2CI(t) = 12(1  )2(1+⌘ 2)+t w0 > 0:
the firm is willing to hire all types of employee (see Appendix 1 for details).
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incentives: Expression (10) implies that @2e⇤(t)/@t@↵(t) = 0. Second, the firm chooses a higher
power of incentives when employees are more sensitive to the social ideal. In this situation, the
social multiplier eﬀect (7) is strengthened, so that eﬀort becomes more reactive to an increase in
the variable rate of the compensation scheme. Third, at equilibrium, the firm has to oﬀer a higher
base salary to employees with a low personal ideal. This is because, for a menu of contracts with
equal variable rates, the certainty equivalent (11) is increasing in the employees’ personal ideal.
This explains why, under incomplete information, the firm will have to propose a diﬀerent menu of
contracts in order to prevent employees with high personal ideals from switching to contracts aimed
at employees with low personal ideals.
3.2.2 The case of incomplete information about personal ideals
We now assume that the firm does not observe the employees’ personal ideals. The firm has to
make sure that each type of employee chooses the contract designed for him. The profit maximizing
program becomes
max
{↵(t), (t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1  ↵(t))e⇤(t)   (t)) f(t)dt (16)
under the participation constraints
8t 2 T, u(t,↵(t), (t))   w0 (17)
and the incentive constraints
8t, t0 2 T, u(t,↵(t), (t))   u(t,↵(t0), (t0)) (18)
Let us consider two employees whose personal ideals t and t0 satisfy t0 > t. Summing the two
incentive constraints u(t,↵(t), (t))   u(t,↵(t0), (t0)) and u(t0,↵(t0), (t0))   u(t0,↵(t), (t)) gives
↵(t0)   ↵(t): Incentive compatibility implies that the power of incentives ↵(.) has to be non-
decreasing. Using standard arguments, we show in Appendix 2 that the optimization problem of
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the firm can be simplified to
max
{↵(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
✓
↵(t)
1    + t  w0  
(1   )↵(t) (1  F (t))
f(t)
  1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt (19)
under the constraints
8t 2 T, d↵(t)
dt
  0 (20)
Expressions (14) and (19) diﬀer because of the term
´ t
t
(1  )↵(t)(1 F (t))
f(t) f(t)dt reflecting the informa-
tional rent the firm has to give to types t > t for them not to deviate from their specified contracts.
This rent is decreasing in  : The adverse selection problem is less severe when employees are more
concerned with the collective identity. By adhering to the social ideal, employees are less aﬀected
by their personal work ideals and they behave more homogeneously. To solve the maximization
problem, we ignore momentarily the constraints (20) and maximize expression (19) pointwise. We
obtain
8t 2 T,↵⇤II(t) =
1
(1   )(1 + ⌘ 2)   (1   )
1  F (t)
f(t)
1
1 + ⌘ 2
(21)
where II stands for incomplete information. To guarantee that the neglected constraints (20) are
verified, we make the following assumption, which is common in an agency context, regarding the
hazard rate:
Assumption 1. The hazard rate f(t)1 F (t) is increasing in t.
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Under Assumption 1, the firm is able to screen employees according to their personal ideals. The
properties of ↵⇤II(t) are described in the following proposition.14
Proposition 2.
1. The power of incentives ↵⇤II(t) is increasing in t. There is no distortion in the contract
designed for the highest personal ideal: ↵⇤II(t¯) = ↵⇤CI(t¯) and there is a downward distortion for the
other personal ideals: ↵⇤CI(t)  ↵⇤II(t) = (1   )1 F (t)f(t) 11+⌘ 2 increases as t approaches t.
2. The firm provides stronger monetary incentives when employees are more sensitive to the
13This assumption is verified for distributions such as the uniform, the normal, the logistic and the Laplace, among
others.
14Again, the assumption t   w0 guarantees that the firm is willing to hire all types of employee (see Appendix 2
for details).
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social ideal: ↵⇤II(t) increases when   increases. Furthermore, the distortion measured by ↵⇤CI(t)  
↵⇤II(t) decreases when employees are more sensitive to the social ideal.
3. The power of incentives ↵⇤II(t) is decreasing in the perceived risk level, ⌘ 2.
Point 1 of Proposition 2 is a result typical of adverse selection problems, adapted to our context. To
prevent employees with a high personal ideal from deviating, the firm has to give employees with
smaller personal ideals a contract in which the power of incentives is lower than under complete
information, but in which the fixed part of the compensation is larger (to satisfy the participation
constraint). As a consequence, there is a downward distortion compared with the case of complete
information. Point 2 conveys two important new results. First, the firm chooses a higher power of
monetary incentives when employees are more sensitive to the social ideal. As employees become
more oriented toward the collective, the social multiplier stated in Proposition 1 has a stronger eﬀect
on the average eﬀort: dE [e] /dE [↵] = 1/(1    ) increases as   increases. Second, the distortion
between the complete information case and the incomplete information case, ↵⇤CI(t)   ↵⇤II(t), is
reduced when employees are more sensitive to the social ideal. In fact, the influence of heterogeneous
personal ideals on individual behaviors diminishes when employees become more concerned with
the group environment. In this case the firm proposes less diﬀerentiated monetary incentives.15 In
point 3, we retrieve a standard result of moral hazard models stating that the firm chooses a lower
power of monetary incentives when employees are more risk adverse (higher ⌘) or when output is
less linked to eﬀort (higher  ). At equilibrium the profit of the firm is
⇡⇤( ) = E [t]  w0 + 1
2(1 + ⌘ 2)
t¯ˆ
t
1
(1   )2
✓
1  (1   )
2 (1  F (t))
f(t)
◆2
f(t)dt (22)
Not surprisingly, the profit increases in the average personal ideal, E [t], and increasing when em-
ployees become more sensitive to the social ideal.
15If all employees have the same personal ideal tˆ (that is, T =
 
tˆ
 
), then 1 F (tˆ)
f(tˆ)
= 0 and we have:
↵⇤(tˆ) =
1
(1   )(1 + ⌘ 2) .
We retrieve the result of section 3.2.1 concerning the case of complete information about personal ideals.
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4 Regulating employees’ ideals through social interaction
We now assume that the firm is able to influence the social orientation of its workforce by choosing
the amount of time during which employees can interact. Social interaction can, for example, be
fostered and to some extent controlled by the firm through the design of the workplace, through
the holding of workshops and team-building activities, or by facilitating recreational breaks. There
is a large amount of empirical evidence in sociology, management science, political science, and
economics suggesting that individuals are more sensitive to a group norm when they have frequent
interaction with the other individuals belonging to the group (e.g., Cialdini and Trost, 2008, for
sociology; Van Dick, 2004, and Cohen and Prusak, 2001, for management science; Putnam, 1995,
for political science; Mas and Moretti, 2009, and Bandieri, Barankay, and Rasul, 2008 and 2010, for
economics). Sociologists emphasize the fact that people learn and internalize the values, beliefs, and
norms of a group through repeated interaction with its members (Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2011).
The act of matching behaviors and beliefs to a group norm is referred to as conformity and is seen
as the result of unconscious influences or social pressures exerted by the group. Individuals are
more aﬀected by these stimuli when they interact frequently, and they are more willing to bear
the emotional investment required to conform: their sensitivity to the group norm increases. The
researchers in management science who have developed the concept of organizational identification
also argue that fostering social interaction within an organization causes employees to identify with
the workgroup. Cohen and Prusak note, for example, that “if you want people to connect, to talk,
to begin to understand and depend on one another, give them places and occasions for meeting,
and enough time to develop networks and communities. Social capital needs breathing room - social
space and time - within work and surrounding work”. Friedley and Manchester (2005) make a similar
point to explain what determines team cohesion in debate teams in high schools and colleges: “It is
communication in the human moment that most powerfully creates team cohesion - a strong sense
of loyalty and commitment to the team vision as one’s own ... Whether a room or lounge where
team members can congregate between classes and the end of the day, practice space for formal
and informal coaching sessions, travel time in cars and vans, or social time to enjoy pizza and a
movie, both quantity and quality of communication are necessary to build a cohesive team climate
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of openness and trust” (italics added).16
We normalize the length of employees’ working time to 1. The firm divides the time between a
productive period of length p where the instantaneous production problem is described in the two
previous sections, and a period of length b = 1  p during which social bonding takes place. There
is no physical production during social bonding. The firm is able to announce and commit to the
allocation of working hours before proposing the menu of contracts. As explained above, we assume
that the employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal is influenced by the firm’s choice. The more time
is allocated to social interaction, the more employees become sensitive to the social ideal. Formally,
 (b) is increasing in b. We assume that during the period in which social bonding takes place, the
employees receive their reservation wage, w0, at each instant of time. The firm solves
max
b
(1  b)⇡⇤ ( (b)) + b( w0)
where ⇡⇤ ( ) is given by expression (22). The first-order condition of the profit maximization reads
 (b) ⌘  E [t] + 1
(1 + ⌘ 2)(1   (b))2
✓
 (b)  1
2
◆ t¯ˆ
t
 
1   (t, b) 2f(t)dt
+
2 (b)
(1 + ⌘ 2)
t¯ˆ
t
 
1   (t, b) 1  F (t)
f(t)
f(t)dt = 0 (23)
where  (b) = (1 b) 
0(b)
1  (b) and  (t, b) =
(1  (b))2(1 F (t))
f(t) . The function  (.) measures the ability of the
firm to make its employees more sensitive to the social ideal, starting from any length of interaction.
Note that  (0) > 0 =  (1). We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. (i)  (0) > 0. (ii)  (b) is decreasing in b over [0, 1]. (iii) There is a level bˆ 2 (0, 1)
satisfying  (bˆ) = 1/2.
Assumption 2 guarantees that the firm’s ability to increase the employees’ sensitivity to the group
is suﬃciently high to ensure that the firm will find it profitable to invest in social interaction. We
describe the properties of the optimal length of social interaction in the following proposition.
16Interestingly, both the sociological and the management literatures mentioned above state that face-to-face in-
teraction is more eﬀective than mediated interaction in creating a shared identity.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that assumption 2 holds and let the average personal ideal of employees
be E(t) = tˆ, then
1. When employees are homogeneous with regard to their personal ideals (T =
 
tˆ
 
), the firm
chooses to devote a proportion b⇤ > 0 of working time to social interaction. We have b⇤ = bˆ if tˆ = 0,
where bˆ is defined in Assumption 2. Furthermore, b⇤ is decreasing in tˆ.
2. When employees are heterogeneous with regard to their personal ideals, the firm chooses to
devote a share b⇤⇤ > b⇤ of working time to social interaction. Furthermore b⇤⇤ is decreasing in tˆ.17
Proof. Suppose that employees are identical. Expression (23) reduces to
 tˆ+ 1
(1 + ⌘ 2)(1   (b))2
✓
 (b)  1
2
◆
= 0 (24)
If tˆ = 0 then the solution of (24) is b⇤ = bˆ with  (bˆ) = 1/2. If tˆ > 0 then the solution of (24) is
b⇤ < bˆ. It is easily verified that b⇤ is decreasing in tˆ. Suppose employees are not identical (and
hence necessarily tˆ > 0) then
´ t¯
t
 
1    (t, b) 2f(t)dt < 1. Furthermore, the last term of equation
(23) is positive. The solution of (23) is therefore b⇤⇤ > b⇤. ⌅
Proposition 3 expresses two results. First, it is less profitable for the firm to devote time to
developing the employees’ social ideal when their average personal ideal is high. In this case, eﬀort
is fueled by personal work ethics and it is therefore more costly for the firm to replace productive
activities with bonding activities. Second, for a given average personal ideal, the firm devotes more
time to developing social interaction for heterogeneous employees than for homogeneous employees.
When employees are heterogeneous, the firm faces an adverse selection problem when designing the
contracts, and it has to give a rent to the employees with a high personal ideal of eﬀort to make
them choose the right contract. By fostering the social orientation of the workforce, the firm is able
to reduce the eﬀect of heterogeneity on individual behaviors and to alleviate the adverse selection
problem. Its profit therefore increases.
The past few decades have seen a surge in the number of firms using bonding activities. What
has driven such a change? Some researchers suggest that, in times when job security and employees’
attachment to firms are diminishing, firms could use soft management policies to shift employees’
identity from being personal to being collective (Casey, 1996 or Pratt, 2000). Casey (1996) notes,
17To make tˆ vary, we “shift” the entire distribution F (t) and its support to the right.
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for example, that “the devices of workplace family and team manifest a corporate eﬀort to provide
emotional gratifications at work to counter the attractions of rampant individualism”.18 Other
researchers highlight the dramatic changes that have occurred in the demographics of the workforce
in developed countries in recent decades. These changes include increases in gender, age, ethnic and
cultural diversity.19 This shift in workforce demographics suggests that work ethos have become
more diverse and contrasting among employees. Cohen and Prusak (2001) explain that nurturing
professional and personal connections among workers is a way for firms to deal with their growing
diversity: The shared identity that emerges from social interaction serves as glue for a heterogeneous
group of people. Our model is consistent with these two types of explanations: Proposition 3
establishes that a decrease in the average personal work ideal of employees or a greater heterogeneity
leads the firm to allocate more time to bonding activities.
Proposition 3 describes the firm’s investment in social interaction for workforces with diﬀerent
characteristics. We now describe how the firm’s choices change when its ability to engender social
contacts changes. To do so, it is convenient to consider two firms, denoted by 1 and 2, who diﬀer
in a single dimension, their ability to foster social interaction. Their respective workforces have the
same characteristics. The diﬀerence between firm 1 and 2 can be explained by the characteristics
of their workplaces or by the nature of their activities, as in the example we describe below. To
capture the diﬀerence in abilities to foster social interaction, we assume that  1(b) and  2(b) are
diﬀerent as soon as the firm invests in some social capital. More specifically,
Definition 1. Given the workforce characteristics, the environment of firm 1 is said to be conducive
to social interaction while the environment of firm 2 is not if
•  1(0) =  2(0) =  ˆ.
• For any b 2 (0, 1] we have  1(b) >  2(b).
•  1(0) >  ˆ and  2(0)   ˆ where  ˆ = 12
´ t¯
t (1  ˆ(t))2f(t)dt+2(1+⌘ 2)(1  ˆ)2E[t]´ t¯
t (1  ˆ(t))2f(t)dt+2(1  ˆ)2
´ t¯
t (1  ˆ(t))(1 F (t))dt
and  ˆ(t) =
(1   ˆ)2 1 F (t)f(t) .
18Nevertheless there is still a lively debate about the real trend in work ethics in recent decades, with some authors
suggesting a declining trend and others suggesting stability or even an increasing trend (Twenge, 2010).
19For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median age of the American workforce was
about 41 years in 2008, compared to about 36 twenty years earlier. For the first time in American history, there are
four generations in the workplace. As regards the participation of women in the workforce, women hold 51.4 percent
of managerial and professional jobs in 2010, up from 26.1 percent in 1980.
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The first point of the definition states that the employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal is the same
for the two firms for b = 0, that is, when there is no investment in social bonding. The second
and third points guarantee that it is less eﬃcient for firm 2 to invest in social interaction because
it has a smaller eﬀect on the employees’ sensitivity to the social ideal than for firm 1. In fact  ˆ is
constructed to guarantee that  1(0)   0 >  2(0), meaning that firm 1 invests in a positive amount
of social interaction (b⇤1 > 0) while firm 2 does not invest at all (b⇤2 = 0).
The diﬀerences in investment levels and in investment eﬃciencies explain that, at equilib-
rium, firm 1’s employees will be more sensitive to the social ideal than firm 2’s employees:  ⇤1 =
 1(b⇤1) >  ⇤2 =  2(0). This has the following consequence on the remuneration schemes ↵⇤II,i(t) =
1
(1  ⇤i )(1+⌘ 2)   (1   
⇤
i )
1 F (t)
f(t)
1
1+⌘ 2 , t 2 T, i = 1, 2 proposed by the two firms:
Proposition 4. Consider two firms whose workforces have identical characteristics and suppose
that the environment of firm 1 is conducive to social interaction while the environment of firm 2 is
not, in the sense of definition 1. Then we have ↵⇤II,1(t) > ↵⇤II,2(t) and
@↵⇤II,1(t)
@t <
@↵⇤II,2(t)
@t for any t
in T : firm 1 devises a remuneration scheme with stronger monetary incentives than firm 2, but less
diﬀerentiated with respect to personal work ideals.
Proposition 4 notably states that a firm having greater ability to create social interaction devises
a menu of contracts that is less diﬀerentiated with respect to personal ideals than a firm having
less ability. The reason is that the former firm is able to make its employees more sensitive to
the social ideal, which attenuates the need to diﬀerentiate the payment contracts to separate the
diﬀerent types of employees. Frank (1984) provides evidence in which firms where employees can
easily interact use less diﬀerentiated commission schedules than firms where employees cannot. He
compares commission schemes used in the automobile dealership industry with those used in real
estate firms. His data concerns thirteen auto dealerships located in upstate New York (see Table
A.1 in Appendix 3). In this industry, salespersons typically receive a share ↵ of the gross margin
realized with the sale (the selling price of the vehicle minus its wholesale cost). He notes that the
thirteen dealerships use schemes with a constant ✓. Regarding the real estate business, Frank studies
the commission schemes used in four large agencies located in Ithaca, New York (see Table A.1).
He observes that three of the four agencies use a tiered commission rate.20 The national association
20Frank (ibid.) considers the commission schemes associated with co-brokered sales. These sales involve two real
21
of realtors also indicates that tiered commission rates are very common in the real estate business.
What is the reason explaining the diﬀerent shapes of pricing schemes used in the two industries?
According to Frank (1984), it is the firms’ ability to engender or not social contact among the
workforce. He notes that there is much more social contact among automobile salespersons than
among real estate persons because “the former spend most of their time working in close physical
proximity of one another, while many of the latter work primarily out of their own homes; and
most spend the bulk of their working hours visiting houses with prospective buyers. Both the
psychologist’s models of attention and the sociologist’s description of the reference group stress the
roles of exposure and proximity as determinants of what we focus most closely”. Note finally that
the average commission rate set by the automobile dealerships is below the average commission rate
set by the real estate agencies, which seems to contradict the result of Proposition 4. However,
the levels are hardly comparable because they are not calculated over the same measure of the
output. In fact, a crude calculation using the figures of Table A.1 and footnote 20 gives (average)
commission rates of 0.55 ⇥ 0.07/2 ' 2% for real estate selling agents, well below the commission
rates for automobile sellers.
5 Concluding remarks
The literature on economics and management theory has recently emphasized that workers are not
driven solely by personal considerations but are also concerned with the goals and beliefs of the
group or organization in which they work. This observation has led some authors to suggest that
to foster performance, firms could try to influence the way their employees perceive and internalize
these goals. In their textbook Economics, Organizations and Management, Milgrom and Roberts
(1992) note, for example, that "important features of many organizations can best be understood
in terms of deliberate attempts to change preferences of individual participants".
In this article, we emphasize that firms have two specific characteristics that make it easier
for them to change preferences of their employees. First, the firm creates an environment well
estate agencies interacting through a multiple listing service (MLS). The listing agency represents the seller and is
responsible for marketing the property and overseeing the transaction. It shares the information about the property
with other agencies in the MLS. The selling agency actually sells the property by finding the buyer. When the
transaction is realized, a commission representing 6 to 7 % of the price of the house is paid by the seller and shared
(usually equally) between the listing agency and the selling agency. The selling agency then pays a part of the money
received to the agent who has found the client (the “selling agent”) and concluded the sale.
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identified (e.g., the workplace) in which workers can interact. The consequence is that a process of
socialization can take place in this environment, during which employees internalize the social ideal
of the workgroup. Second, the firm can regulate the intensity of socialization by allowing for more
or less social interaction through the relevant workplace and management practices.
We show that the firm, by acting as a locus of socialization, is able to motivate and coordinate
a heterogeneous workforce more eﬃciently. Motivation is higher because the social ideal engenders
positive social complementarities that foster eﬀort and improve the eﬀectiveness of monetary incen-
tives. Coordination is easier because as the social ideal attenuates the adverse selection problem, the
actions of heterogeneous employees can be made incentive compatible at a smaller cost. Therefore,
the firm can devise less distorted payment schemes. In fact, our analysis complements the work
of researchers who view the firm as being the organization the most able to derive benefits from
complementary but heterogeneous resources. Lazear (2013) summarizes this view by arguing that
“perhaps the greatest value of the firm is that it provides a mechanism for people to work together
and take advantage of complementarities in their skills and interests”. Nevertheless, we consider
the case in which the complementarities between workers are not technological but rather social.
In this context, the main value of the firm is to provide a mechanism enabling the creation and
regulation of a “We” frame among employees, through social contacts in the workplace. Over the
last few decades, higher turnover rates and the increased diversity of the workforce have probably
strengthened the need for firms to act as locuses of socialization. This may explain the development
of workplace designs and management practices aimed at fostering social contact among employees.
The new workplace engenders both social incentives substituting for low individual work ethics and
shared representations of actions among the heterogeneous workforce.
Several extensions of the model could be of interest. First, in line with the preceding discussion,
it could be interesting to modify the model so that, in addition to their eﬀects on work ideals, social
interactions have also a direct positive eﬀect on employees’ productivity. For example, employees
could learn and exchange knowledge when interacting. This should reinforce the incentives of the
firm to invest in social interaction. Second, there is only one reference group in our framework,
namely the entire workforce, relative to which the social ideal of eﬀort is defined. It could be
interesting to make the number of reference groups endogenous and assume that employees choose
the group they wish to conform to. Third, we assume that employees have the same sensitivity
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to the social ideal. Another possible extension could therefore be to allow for diﬀerent degrees of
sensitivity among workers.21
To conclude, let us listen to the British anthropologist and evolutionary psychologist Robin
Dunbar (1998) who explains why a TV production team experienced reduced productivity after
being moved to a new workplace. “It turned out that when the architects were designing the new
building, they decided that the coﬀee room where everyone ate their sandwiches at lunch time was
an unnecessary luxury and so dispensed with it ... If people were encouraged to eat their sandwiches
at their desks, then they were more likely to get on with their work and less likely to idle time away.
And with that, they inadvertently destroyed the intimate social networks that empowered the whole
organization” (italics added).
References
[1] Akerlof. G. (1980). A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment may be One
Consequence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 94, 749-775.
[2] Akerlof, G. and Kranton, R. (2008). Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups. American
Economic Review 2008, 98, 2, 212–217.
[3] Bandiera, O., Barankay, I. and Rasul, I. (2008). Social Capital in the Workplace:
Evidence on its Formation and Consequences. Labour Economics, 15, 725-749.
[4] Bandiera, O., Barankay, I. and Rasul, I. (2010). Social Incentives in the Workplace.
Review of Economic Studies, 77, 417–458.
[5] Bénabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 70, 3, 489-520.
[6] Bénabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. American Eco-
nomic Review, 96 (5),1652-1678.
[7] Bicchieri, C. and Muldoon, R. (2011). Social Norms. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
21Fischer and Huddart (2008) explore this possibility.
24
[8] Canton, E. (2005). Power of Incentives in Public Organization when Employees are
Intrinsically Motivated. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161, 4,
664-680.
[9] Casey, C. (1996). Corporate Transformations: Designer Culture, Designer Employees
and Post-Occupational Solidarity. Organization, 3, 3, 317-339.
[10] Cialdini, R. and Trost, M. (2008). Social influence: Social Norms, Conformity and
Compliance. In D. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The Handbook of Social
Psychology, 4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 151-192. New York. McGraw Hill.
[11] Cohen, D. and Prusak, L. (2001). In Good Company. How Social Capital Makes Or-
ganizations Work. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA.
[12] Cooper, R. and John, A. (1988). Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian
Models. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 441–463.
[13] Dunbar, R. (1998). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
[14] Dur, R. and Sol, J. (2010) Social Interaction, Co-worker Altruism, and Incentives.
Games and Economic Behavior, 69, 2, 293-301.
[15] Ellemers, N., De Gilder, D. and Haslam, S.A. (2004). Motivating Individuals and
Groups at Work: A Social Identity Perspective on Leadership and Group Performance.
The Academy of Management Review, 29, 3, 459-478.
[16] Fischer, P. and Huddart, S. (2008). Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Social
Norms. American Economic Review, 98, 1459–75.
[17] Foss, N. J. and Lindenberg, S. (2012), Teams, Team Motivation, and the Theory of
the Firm. Managerial and Decision Economics, 33, 369–383.
[18] Frank, R. (1984). Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products? American Economic
Review, 74, 549-71.
25
[19] Friedley, S. and Manchester, B. (2005). Building Team Cohesion: Becoming "We"
Instead of "Me". National Forensic Journal, vol. 23, no. 1.
[20] Francois, P. (2000). Public Service Motivation as an Argument for Government Provi-
sion. Journal of Public Economics, 78, 3, 275-299.
[21] Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1987). Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of
Intertemporal Incentives. Econometrica, 55, 303-28.
[22] Huck, S., Kübler D., and Weibull J. (2010). Social Norms and Economic Incentives in
Firms. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83, 173– 185.
[23] Kandel, E. and Lazear, E.P. (1992). Peer Pressure and Partnerships. Journal of Political
Economy, 100, 801-817.
[24] Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (1996). What Firms do? Coordination, Identity, and Learn-
ing. Organization Science, 7, 5, 502-518.
[25] Kübler, D. (2001). On the Regulation of Social Norms. Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, Oxford University Press, 17, 449-76.
[26] Laﬀont, J.J. and Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent
Model. Princeton University Press.
[27] Lazear, E.P. (2013) Personnel Economics. In R. Gibbons & J. Roberts eds. The Hand-
book of Organizational Economics. Princeton University Press.
[28] Mas, A. and Moretti, E. (2009). Peers at Work. American Economic Review, 99, 1,
112-45.
[29] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, Organization, and Management. En-
glewood Cliﬀs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992
[30] Pratt, M. (2000). The Good, the Bad, and the Ambivalent: Managing Identification
among Amway Distributors. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 456-493.
[31] Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. Journal of
Democracy, 6, 65-78.
26
[32] Rob, R. and Zemsky P. (2002). Social Capital, Corporate Culture, and Incentive In-
tensity. The RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 2, 243-257.
[33] Rotemberg, J. (1994). Human Relations in the Workplace. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 102, 4, 684-717.
[34] Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In
W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.
Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole.
[35] Theilen, B. (2003). Simultaneous Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection with Risk Averse
Agents. Economics Letters, 79, 2, 283–289.
[36] Twenge, J. (2010). A Review of the Empirical Evidence on Generational Diﬀerences in
Work Attitudes. Journal of Business and Psychology, 25, 201-210.
[37] Van Dick, R. (2004). My Job is my Castle: Identification in Organizational Contexts.
International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 19.
27
Appendices
Appendix 1. Derivation of the optimal contract under complete information
Using expressions (4) and (10) and setting ↵(t)e⇤(t) +  (t)   12 (e⇤(t)  n(t))2   12⌘ 2↵2(t) = w0,
we can write
t¯ˆ
t
((1  ↵(t))e⇤(t)   (t)) f(t)dt =
t¯ˆ
t
✓
e⇤(t)  w0   1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
✓
(1   )t+  E [t] + (1   )↵(t) +  E [↵]
1      ...
◆
f(t)dt
=  E [t] +
 E [↵]
1    +
t¯ˆ
t
((1   )t+ ↵(t)  ...) f(t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
✓
 t+
 ↵(t)
1   
◆
f(t)dt+
t¯ˆ
t
((1   )t+ ↵(t)  ...) f(t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
✓
↵(t)
1    + t  w0  
1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt
We could allow for some shutdown of types. Shutdown (if any) occurs on an interval [t, t⇤] for some
t⇤ > t . t⇤ is obtained as a solution to
max
{t⇤}
t¯ˆ
t⇤
✓
(1   )t+  E [t/t > t⇤] + (1   )↵
⇤
CI(t) +  E [↵
⇤
CI/t > t
⇤]
1     
1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵⇤2CI(t)
◆
f(t)dt
which can be rewritten as
max
{t⇤}
tˆ
t⇤
✓
↵⇤CI(t)
1    + t  w0  
1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵⇤2CI(t)
◆
f(t)dt
If the solution is interior, we have
↵⇤CI(t
⇤)
1     
1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵⇤2CI(t
⇤) = w0   t⇤
so that w0   t⇤ > 0. As t > w0 we have t⇤ < t: A contradiction. ⌅
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Appendix 2. Derivation of the optimal contract under incomplete information
We want to show that the program
max
{↵(t), (t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1  ↵(t))e⇤(t))   (t)) f(t)dt (25)
subject to
8t 2 T, u(t,↵(t), (t))   w0 (26)
and
8t, t0 2 T, u(t,↵(t), (t))   u(t,↵(t0), (t0)) (27)
can be simplified to
max
{↵(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
✓
↵(t)
1    + t  w0  
(1   )↵(t) (1  F (t))
f(t)
  1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt (28)
subject to
8t 2 T, d↵(t)
dt
= 0 (29)
We roughly follow the method of Laﬀont and Martimort (2002). For convenience, let us define
u(t, t˜) = u(t,↵(t˜), (t˜)) where
u(t,↵(t˜), (t˜)) =  (t˜) +
 
1   ↵(t˜)E [↵] + ((1   )t+  E [t])↵(t˜) +
1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(t˜) (30)
is the certainty equivalent payoﬀ for an employee with personal ideal t when he has chosen the
contract
 
↵(t˜), (t˜)
 
(see equation (11)). Let u(t) = u(t, t). Condition (27) implies the following
local first-order condition for type t: @u(t,t˜)
@ t˜
   
t˜=t
= 0 or
d (t)
dt
+
 
1   
d↵(t)
dt
E [↵] + ((1   )t+  E [t])d↵(t)
dt
+ (1  ⌘ 2)↵(t)d↵(t)
dt
= 0 (31)
The local second-order condition for t is @
2u(t,t˜)
@ t˜2
   
t˜=t
 0 or
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d2 (t)
dt2
+
 
1   
d2↵(t)
dt2
E [↵] + ((1   )t+  E [t])d
2↵(t)
dt2
+ (1  ⌘ 2)
 ✓
d↵(t)
dt
◆2
+ ↵(t)
d2↵(t)
dt2
!
 0
(32)
By diﬀerentiating (31) with respect to t, we find
d2 (t)
dt2
+
 
1   
d2↵(t)
dt2
E [↵]+(1  )d↵(t)
dt
+((1  )t+ E [t])d
2↵(t)
dt2
+(1 ⌘ 2)
 ✓
d↵(t)
dt
◆2
+ ↵(t)
d2↵(t)
dt2
!
= 0
(33)
By using (32), (33) can be written as d↵(t)dt   0. Note that the local incentive constraint for the
employee of type t (expression (31)) implies the global incentive constraint (expression (27)). To
prove it, let us consider t0 6= t. Using (31), we can write
 (t)   (t0) =
ˆ t
t0
 ˙(⌧)d⌧ (34)
=  
ˆ t
t0
✓
 
1   ↵˙(⌧)E [↵] + ((1   )⌧ +  E [t])↵˙(⌧) + (1  ⌘ 
2)↵(⌧)↵˙(⌧)
◆
d⌧
=  
ˆ t
t0
@
@⌧
✓
 
1   ↵(⌧)E [↵] + ((1   )⌧ +  E [t])↵(⌧) +
1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(⌧)  (1   )A(⌧)
◆
d⌧
where A(⌧) is a primitive of ↵(⌧). We have
 (t)   (t0) =  

 
1   ↵(⌧)E [↵] + ((1   )⌧ +  E [t])↵(⌧) +
1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(⌧)
 t
t0
+
ˆ t
t0
(1   )↵(⌧)d⌧
=    
1   ↵(t)E [↵]  ((1   )t+  E [t])↵(t) 
1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(t) +  
1   ↵(t
0)E [↵]
+((1   )t0 +  E [t])↵(t0) + 1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(t0) +
ˆ t
t0
(1   )↵(⌧)d⌧ (35)
Hence
 (t) +
 
1   ↵(t)E [↵] + ((1   )t+  E [t])↵(t) +
1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
=  (t0) +
 
1   ↵(t
0)E [↵] + ((1   )t0 +  E [t])↵(t0) + 1
2
(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(t0) +
ˆ t
t0
(1   )↵(⌧)d⌧
=  (t0)+
 
1   ↵(t
0)E [↵]+((1  )t+ E [t])↵(t0)+1
2
(1 ⌘ 2)↵2(t0) (1  )(t t0)↵(t0)+
ˆ t
t0
(1  )↵(⌧)d⌧
(36)
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Therefore u(t, t) = u(t, t0)  (1   )(t  t0)↵(t0) + ´ tt0(1   )↵(⌧)d⌧ . However  (1   )(t  t0)↵(t0) +´ t
t0(1    )↵(⌧)d⌧ is positive because we know from above that ↵(t) is non-decreasing. Hence, for
any t0 6= t, u(t, t)   u(t, t0): the global incentive constraint is satisfied for type t.
We now rewrite the maximization problem of the firm as a function of ↵(t) and u(t) instead of
↵(t) and  (t). We know that u(t) =  (t)+  1  ↵(t)E [↵]+ ((1  )t+ E [t])↵(t)+ 12(1  ⌘ 2)↵2(t).
The incentive constraints (31) are replaced by the constraints du(t)dt = (1    )↵(t) and d↵(t)dt   0.22
Using the fact that du(t)dt > 0 allows the participation constraints (26) to be simplified to u(t) = w0.
The problem of the firm becomes
max
{↵(t),u(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
✓
(1   )↵(t) +  E [↵]
1    + (1   )t+  E [t]  u(t) 
1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt (37)
under the constraints:
8t 2 T, du(t)
dt
= (1   )↵(t) (38)
8t 2 T, d↵(t)
dt
= 0 (39)
u(t) = w0 (40)
Using (38) and (40), we have u(t) = u(t)+
´ t
t (1  )↵(⌧)d⌧ = w0+
´ t
t (1  )↵(⌧)d⌧ . Therefore, we
can rewrite (37) as
max
{↵(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
0@(1   )↵(t) +  E [↵]
1    + (1   )t+  E [t] 
tˆ
t
(1   )↵(⌧)d⌧   w0   1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
1A f(t)dt
(41)
However
22Indeed du(t)dt = (1  )↵(t)+
⇣
d (t)
dt +
 
1  
d↵(t)
dt E [↵] + ((1   )t+  E [t]) d↵(t)dt + (1  ⌘ 2)↵(t) d↵(t)dt
⌘
, but the term
in parentheses is zero from the first-order condition (31).
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t¯ˆ
t
0@ tˆ
t
(1   )↵(⌧)d⌧
1A f(t)dt =
24F (t) tˆ
t
(1   )↵(⌧)d⌧
35t
t
 
t¯ˆ
t
((1   )↵(t))F (t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
(1   )↵(t)dt 
t¯ˆ
t
(1   )↵(t)F (t)dt =
t¯ˆ
t
(1   )↵(t) (1  F (t)) dt
Hence the problem of the firm becomes
max
{↵(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
✓
(1   )↵(t) +  E [↵]
1    + (1   )t+  E [t]  w0  
(1   )↵(t) (1  F (t))
f(t)
  1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt
(42)
subject to (39), or
max
{↵(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
✓
↵(t)
1    + t  w0  
(1   )↵(t) (1  F (t))
f(t)
  1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵2(t)
◆
f(t)dt (43)
subject to (39). ⌅
We can use a similar argument as in Appendix 1 to allow for a possible shutdown of types. Shutdown
(if any) occurs on an interval [t, t⇤] for some t⇤ > t, obtained as a solution of
↵⇤II(t
⇤)
1     
(1   )↵⇤II(t⇤) (1  F (t⇤))
f(t⇤)
  1
2
(1 + ⌘ 2)↵⇤2II(t
⇤) = w0   t⇤
Therefore we have w0   t⇤ > 0. As t > w0 we have t⇤ < t: A contradiction. ⌅
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Appendix 3. Diﬀerences in commission schemes in Automobile Dealerships and Real
Estate Firms
Table A.1: Diﬀerences in commission schemes (from Frank, 1984)
Auto Dealership Real Estate Firms
Dealership Slope of the earnings function, ↵ Firm Selling Agent’s Commission Rate, ↵
1 0.165 1 0.50
2 0.20 2 0.50 if E < $30, 000
3 0.20 0.55 if $30, 000  E < $41, 111
4 0.20 0.575 if $41, 111  E
5 0.20 3 0.50 if E < $26, 000
6 0.25 0.60 if $26, 000  E < $38, 000
7 0.25 0.575 if $38, 000  E
8 0.25 4 0.50 if E < $12, 000
9 0.25 0.55 if $12, 000  E < $18, 000
10 0.25 0.60 if $18, 000  E
11 0.25
12 0.30
13 0.30
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